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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
This is the second appeal of a damages award for 
wrongful termination of a franchise under the New Jersey 
Franchise Practice Act ("NJFPA"). In the first appeal, we 
vacated the award and remanded for a new trial on the 
appellant's NJFPA damages. See Cooper Distrib. Co. v. 
Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 63 F.3d 262 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(Cooper I). The plaintiff appealed again following the second 
trial. After argument, we remanded so that the District 
Court could rule on one open matter. Thereafter, the 
parties returned to this Court. We will affirm in part, 




From 1961 to 1991, Cooper Distributing Company 
("Cooper") was a distributor of appliances manufactured by 
Amana Refrigeration, Inc. ("Amana"). Under the terms of 
their distribution contract, Cooper bought a specified 
quantity of products at a wholesale discount from Amana 
and then resold them to retailers, who in turn sold them to 
consumers. Although Cooper did not have exclusive 
distribution rights under the contract, Cooper was the only 
distributor of Amana products in its territory, which 
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primarily encompassed New York, New Jersey, and 
Connecticut. By 1991, Cooper's sales of Amana products 
generated $20 million per year in revenues and constituted 
about 80 percent of Cooper's business. 
 
In November 1991, Amana attempted to terminate its 
distribution relationship with Cooper on ten days' notice, 
citing a provision in the distribution contract allowing 
either party to do so. It is undisputed that the attempted 
termination was motivated by changes in Amana's 
nationwide business strategy rather than unsatisfactory 
performance on Cooper's part. 
 
Cooper sued Amana in New Jersey state court, alleging 
four causes of action: (1) unlawful termination without good 
cause in violation of the NJFPA; (2) breach of contract; (3) 
breach of the implied obligation of good faith and fair 
dealing; and (4) tortious interference with prospective 
economic advantage. Amana removed the case to federal 
district court in New Jersey. In February 1992, the District 
Court issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting Amana 
from " `taking any action whatsoever to limit . . . or in any 
way interfere with Cooper's activities as a distributor of 
Amana products.' " Cooper I, 63 F.3d at 267-68 (quoting the 
injunction). The injunction was still in effect when the 
parties went to trial in February 1994. 
 
At trial, the jury found Amana liable on all four counts 
and awarded Cooper $4.375 million in compensatory 
damages on its NJFPA claim, $2 million on its breach of 
contract claim, and zero in actual damages on both of the 
remaining two common-law claims. It also awarded Cooper 
$3 million in punitive damages on the tortious interference 
claim. Accordingly, on March 8, 1994, the District Court 
entered a judgment of $9.375 million in damages to Cooper 
and dissolved the injunction, thereby allowing Amana to 
terminate the distributorship and pay damages. 
 
On appeal, we affirmed the judgment of liability under 
the NJFPA but held the District Court should have found 
as a matter of law that there was no breach of contract; 
therefore, we reversed the award of $2 million in damages 
on that claim. See Cooper I, 63 F.3d at 280-81. We also 
reversed the award of $3 million in punitive damages for 
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tortious interference because no actual damages had been 
found, see id. at 284, and we vacated the award of $4.375 
million in NJFPA damages and remanded for a new trial on 
that issue, see id. at 277-78. 
 
Cooper I identified two defects in the original calculation 
of NJFPA damages. First, the jury had mistakenly assumed 
that Cooper had an exclusive right to sell Amana products 
to retailers in its territory. This assumption, we found, was 
expressly contradicted by the unambiguous terms of the 
contract and it resulted in a significantly higher valuation 
of the franchise. See id. at 278. Second, we held the 
franchise had been valued as of the wrong date. The 
District Court had instructed the jury to value the franchise 
as of November 8, 1991, the date on which Amanafirst 
attempted to terminate the franchise. As we pointed out, 
however, the more appropriate valuation date was March 8, 
1994, the date on which the franchise actually was 
terminated. Cooper had continued to earn income from its 
franchise after November 8, 1991. Thus, to value the 
franchise as of that date would bestow upon Cooper a 
"double recovery," as Cooper would receive both the value 
of the franchise on November 8, 1991 -- that is, the 
present value of lost future earnings from the franchise -- 
and the actual earnings from the franchise after that date. 
Id. Consequently, we held "the proper date of valuation in 
this case is March 8, 1994," id., and remanded for "a new 
trial on [NJFPA damages] consistent with this opinion," id. 
at 285. 
 
On remand, the District Court ruled prior to trial that the 
"only issue" in the case was the franchise's fair market 
value to a hypothetical buyer and seller as of March 8, 
1994. Thus, Cooper was barred from presenting evidence 
relating to additional damages theories, including the value 
of the franchise to the actual parties and the amount of lost 
profits Cooper allegedly suffered before March 8, 1994. 
 
In the second trial, Cooper received an award of 
$377,000. Cooper now appeals, asserting four grounds for 
reversal: (1) the District Court erred in limiting the scope of 
the second trial to a determination of the fair market value 
of the franchise as of March 8, 1994; (2) the court's jury 
instructions were misleading and erroneous; (3) the court 
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improperly allowed hearsay testimony and failed to give 
effect to stipulations by Amana; and (4) the court 





A. Valuation of the Cooper Franchise 
 
Cooper argues the District Court misconstrued our 
mandate in Cooper I, preventing it from proving important 
components of its damages: the value of the franchise to 
Cooper and Amana specifically, rather than to a 
hypothetical buyer and seller; Cooper's lost profits between 
November 8, 1991 and March 8, 1994; the value of 
Cooper's complementary distribution lines; and the 
enhanced value of the franchise due to Amana's 
subsequent expansion of its distribution line. Amana 
responds that the District Court's restriction of damages to 
the fair market value of the franchise as of March 8, 1994 
was not only consistent with Cooper I, but was required by 
the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Westfield 
Centre Serv., Inc. v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 432 A.2d 48 (N.J. 
1981). 
 
We exercise plenary review on these issues because they 
involve whether the District Court properly interpreted the 
law of the case as set forth in Cooper I. See Feather v. 
United Mine Workers of America, 903 F.2d 961, 964 (3d Cir. 
1990). It is "axiomatic" that on remand after an appellate 
court decision, the trial court "must proceed in accordance 
with the mandate and the law of the case as established on 
appeal." Bankers Trust Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 761 
F.2d 943, 949 (3d Cir. 1985). Moreover, where (as here) the 
mandate requires the District Court to proceed in a manner 
"consistent" with the appellate court decision, the effect is 
" `to make the opinion a part of the mandate as completely 
as though the opinion had been set out at length.' " Id. 
(quoting Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 359 F.2d 671, 674 (3d 
Cir. 1966)). 
 
Our opinion in Cooper I did not expressly address 
whether the measures of damages that Cooper now 
proposes should be included in the scope of the second 
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trial. As noted, we remanded in order for the District Court 
to remedy two errors in the original calculation of damages: 
the jury's mistaken assumption that Cooper had possessed 
an exclusive distributorship, and its valuation of the 
franchise as of the wrong date. Cooper does not claim 
either error was repeated in the second trial. Moreover, to 
the extent our opinion provided guidance as to the specific 
method by which damages should be calculated on remand, 
we held the franchise should be valued according to 
" `either the present value of lost future earnings or the 
present market value of the lost business, but not both.' " 
63 F.3d at 278 (quoting Johnson v. Oroweat Foods Co., 785 
F.2d 503, 507 (4th Cir. 1986)). The District Court's choice 
of the latter of these two measures was consistent with that 
mandate. 
 
It was also consistent with New Jersey law, which 
controls in this diversity case. The statute itself does not 
specify a particular measure of damages: "Any franchisee 
may bring an action against its franchisor for violation of 
this act . . . to recover damages sustained by reason of any 
violation of this act and, where appropriate, shall be 
entitled to injunctive relief." N.J. Stat. Ann.S 56:10-10 
(West 1998). But in Westfield, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court held that 
 
       a franchisor who in good faith and for a bona fide 
       reason terminates, cancels or fails to renew a franchise 
       for any reason other than the franchisee's substantial 
       breach of its obligations has violated [the NJFPA] and 
       is liable to the franchisee for the loss occasioned 
       thereby, namely, the reasonable value of the business 
       less the amount realizable on liquidation. These are the 
       damages contemplated by N.J.S.A. 56:10-10 . . . . 
 
Westfield, 432 A.2d at 57. The court further held that 
"[r]easonable value would be that price upon which willing 
parties, buyer and seller, would agree for the sale of the 
franchisee's business as a going concern." Id. at 55. It is 
clear from the court's discussion that these "willing parties" 
are hypothetical buyers and sellers, not the actual parties 
in the case: for example, the court noted the potential 
usefulness of IRS valuation techniques and expert 
testimony based on comparable sales in the area. See id. 
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Westfield appears to be the only case that discusses the 
proper measure of damages under the NJFPA. 
 
Here, Amana terminated Cooper "in good faith and for a 
bona fide reason" and not for "the franchisee's substantial 
breach of its obligations." See Cooper I, 63 F.3d at 267 
(describing the business reasons for which Amana decided 
to terminate Cooper's franchise). Thus, under Westfield 
Amana is liable to Cooper for a loss equal to the value of 
the franchise as measured by its fair market value to a 
hypothetical buyer and seller, minus the value of assets 
that can be liquidated by Cooper. 
 
The question is whether this measure of damages 
necessarily excludes the other measures advanced by 
Cooper. As we discuss, Westfield and our mandate in 
Cooper I exclude most of these additional damages theories, 
but they do not refute Cooper's "lost profits" argument. 
 
1. The Value of the Franchise to Cooper and Amana 
 
Cooper contends the District Court should have allowed 
it to present evidence of the franchise's value to the parties 
themselves, rather than its market value as measured by 
what third parties would be willing to pay for it. As noted, 
however, Westfield suggests the opposite. See 432 A.2d at 
55 ("Reasonable value would be that price upon which 
willing parties, buyer and seller, would agree for the sale of 
the franchisee's business as a going concern."). Moreover, 
our opinion in Cooper I refers, variously, to "the current 
value of [the] business," "the value of the business as a 
going concern," and "the present market value of the lost 
business." 63 F.3d at 278. Such terms suggest an objective, 
not subjective, measure of the franchise's value. 
Accordingly, we believe the District Court correctly 
determined that the purported value of the franchise to 
Cooper and Amana themselves was not a proper measure of 
damages. 
 
2. Pre-March 8, 1994 Lost Profits 
 
Cooper argues that although Amana did not actually 
succeed in terminating the franchise until March 8, 1994, 
Cooper's uncertain status before that date caused a decline 
in its profits during the November 1991 to March 1994 
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period. The District Court appears to have acknowledged 
this point. See App. at 319 (statement of the District Court 
that "I can't believe that . . . [Amana's counsel] would have 
for a moment attempted to argue in his opening that the 
jury's verdict in the first trial established Mr. Cooper 
suffered no harm from Amana's conduct during the period 
from mid-1991 to March 8th, 1994"). Lost profits would not 
be accounted for in a valuation of the franchise as of March 
8, 1994 because that value represents only the lost future 
profits of the business: that is, the present value of the 
profits Cooper would have earned after March 8, 1994, had 
its franchise not been unlawfully terminated. See Cooper I, 
63 F.3d at 278. Thus, Cooper contends the pre-March 8, 
1994 lost profits must be included in the damages 
calculation in order to make it whole. In response, Amana 
argues that because Westfield identifies only one measure 
of damages (fair market value of the franchise at the time 
of termination), it implicitly forbids other measures, such 
as lost profits prior to termination. 
 
We find no support for Amana's argument, either in 
Westfield or elsewhere in New Jersey law. The franchisee in 
Westfield was a gasoline station owner whose business was 
not affected by uncertainty surrounding his franchise 
status. Consequently, the fair market value at the date of 
his franchise's termination was a complete and 
comprehensive measure of the harm he suffered. There is 
no reason to believe Westfield precludes lost-profit damages 
in a case where attempted termination of the franchise 
itself causes a substantial decline in business. In fact, 
Westfield's reference to "the legislative intent to make 
franchisees economically whole" supports the inclusion of 
lost profits. 432 A.2d at 58 (awarding attorney's fees); see 
also Winer Motors, Inc. v. Jaguar Rover Triumph, Inc., 506 
A.2d 817, 823 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1986) (holding that under 
Connecticut franchise law, an award for improper 
termination "should have two components, the losses 
provable to that date, and the future damages based upon 
the reasonably anticipated net future profits of the 
dealership," and noting that there is "little difference 
between the law of New Jersey and Connecticut on this 
subject"). Here, Cooper advances the plausible claim that 
retailers were aware of Cooper's ongoing litigation with 
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Amana and consequently did not know whether they could 
count on Cooper for long-term sales and warranty service 
on Amana products. As a result, at least some retailers may 
have chosen to reduce or eliminate their dealings with 
Cooper even before the date of actual termination. 
 
Although we express no opinion on the extent of Cooper's 
lost profits, or even their existence, we believe it was error 
to preclude Cooper from presenting evidence on the issue. 
This component of damages was not expressly commanded 
by Cooper I or Westfield, but it is undeniably a part of the 
loss suffered by Cooper as a result of Amana's unlawful 
termination of its franchise. Inclusion of lost profits during 
this period is the logical result of shifting the valuation date 
from November 1991 to March 1994. Accordingly, we will 
reverse and remand for a new trial on this issue. 
 
3. Cooper's Loss of Complementary Lines 
 
Cooper also contends its damages should have included 
the value of what it calls "complementary lines," that is, 
product lines carried by Cooper for the sole purpose of 
complementing its Amana products. The complementary 
lines consisted primarily of Hardwick, In-Sink-Erator, and 
Dacor products. Cooper alleges that when it lost the Amana 
franchise, its ability to sell these products at a profit was 
destroyed. 
 
We do not believe this issue warrants a new trial. 
Westfield specifically instructs that the value of assets 
retained by the franchisee is to be deducted from the 
damages award. See 432 A.2d at 57. It may be true that 
Cooper would not have purchased the complementary lines 
if it did not also sell Amana products. But that fact does 
not have any legal significance. Cooper acknowledges that 
it was not required to purchase the additional lines, only 
"encouraged" to do so by Amana. The complementary lines 
fall squarely within the category of assets retained by the 
franchisee under Westfield, and the District Court properly 
excluded their value from the damages calculation. 
 
4. Enhanced Value of the Franchise 
 
Cooper also contends the District Court erred in refusing 
to allow it to amend its expert report to reflect the 
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"enhanced value" that Cooper's franchise would have 
received between November 1991 and March 1994, if 
Amana had allowed it to partake in the expansion of 
Amana's products lines that occurred during that time. 
Allegedly, three other Amana distributors were given access 
to the additional brands (Caloric, Modern Maid, and Speed 
Queen) that had been consolidated by Amana's parent 
company, Raytheon. Cooper claims it was denied access to 
these additional lines solely because Amana was in the 
process of attempting to terminate Cooper's franchise; thus, 
Cooper should be allowed to include the value of these lines 
as a component of its damages.1 
 
It is unclear whether Amana denied Cooper access to the 
additional product lines solely because of the pending 
litigation. But in any event, Amana was under no legal 
obligation to offer an expanded product line to Cooper, only 
to maintain the status quo as required by the injunction 
that was in effect at the time. As of March 8, 1994, Cooper 
had never had access to the additional lines and did not 
have the prospect of access in the future. We believe the 
expansion offered to other Amana distributors was properly 
excluded from the calculation of the Cooper franchise's 
value on that date. 
 
B. Jury Instructions 
 
Cooper attacks the District Court's jury instructions on a 
myriad of grounds, all of which fall within one of two 
general criticisms: (1) the District Court failed to explain 
the law thoroughly; and (2) the court's pricing instructions 
were unfairly prejudicial to Cooper.2 The parties dispute 
whether Cooper's objections to the jury instructions were 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Contrary to Cooper's assertions, we find no defect in the procedure by 
which the motion to amend the report was denied. In any event, we 
believe Cooper's argument regarding enhanced value fails on the merits. 
 
2. Cooper also makes the related claim that the District Court should 
have allowed Cooper to introduce into evidence a historical pricing 
analysis showing the discounts that Cooper had traditionally received 
from Amana. We do not believe the court abused its discretion in 
refusing to admit the exhibit, particularly since Cooper's expert was 
allowed to testify about Cooper's historical discounts and profit margin 
without the exhibit. 
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timely made, and accordingly what the appropriate 
standard of review is. 
 
We exercise plenary review to determine whether jury 
instructions misstated the applicable law, but in the 
absence of a misstatement we review for abuse of 
discretion. See Walden v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 126 F.3d 
506, 513 (3d Cir. 1997); Savarese v. Agriss, 883 F.2d 1194, 
1202 (3d Cir.1989). If the party claiming error did not make 
a timely objection, we review for plain error. See Ryder v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 128 F.3d 128, 136 (3d Cir. 1997). 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 51 provides that a party may not assign as 
error defects in jury instructions unless the party distinctly 
stated its objection before the jury retired to consider its 
verdict. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 51; accord Smith v. Borough of 
Wilkinsburg, 147 F.3d 272, 277 (3d Cir. 1998) ("[T]o 
preserve an issue for appeal, counsel must state distinctly 
the matter objected to and the grounds of the objection."). 
We will reverse only if the trial court committed plain error 
that was "fundamental and highly prejudicial, such that the 
instructions failed to provide the jury with adequate 
guidance and our refusal to consider the issue would result 
in a miscarriage of justice." Ryder, 128 F.3d at 136. 
 
Cooper did not object at the close of jury instructions. 
When the District Court asked Cooper's counsel if he had 
any objections after the jury charge, he responded only by 
correcting one of the exhibit numbers. Moreover, Cooper 
had previously participated in a charge conference in which 
both parties met with the judge and agreed on mutually 
satisfactory language on all the instructions. It appears 
from the record that the District Court gave the 
instructions agreed upon by the parties at the charge 
conference. 
 
Nevertheless, Cooper claims its objections were properly 
preserved and should receive plenary review. Cooper relies 
upon two cases. In the first, Bowley v. Stotler & Co., 751 
F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1985), we held the appellant's objection 
was preserved because the trial court expressly told 
appellant that his previous written objections would 
constitute an automatic objection to every adverse ruling 
and that his objections would be preserved in the record. 
See id. at 647. But Bowley is of little help to Cooper, who 
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received no such assurance from the District Court. In the 
second, Thornley v. Penton Publishing, Inc., 104 F.3d 26 (2d 
Cir. 1997), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held 
that failure to object is sometimes excused when a party 
has "previously made its position clear to the trial judge 
and any further attempt to change the judge's mind would 
have been futile." Id. at 30. Arguably, Cooper had made its 
position known to the District Court in its proposed jury 
instructions and at the charge conference, and therefore 
believed that further objection would be futile. But this 
argument is belied by the fact that immediately after giving 
its instructions, the District Court expressly invited any 
objections by the parties. Cooper did not object at this time. 
Therefore, we believe Cooper's exceptions to the jury 
instructions were not preserved and are subject to plain 
error review. 
 
As noted, Cooper proffers two basic challenges, each of 
which includes more specific criticisms. First, Cooper 
claims the District Court did not thoroughly explain the 
relevant law to the jury. According to Cooper, prior to trial 
the jury should have been instructed as to: the definition of 
a "franchise"; the meaning of the "license" and "community 
of interest" elements of an NJFPA violation; the legal 
standards for an implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing; and the meaning of "constructive termination." 
Cooper claims the District Court's failure to issue a 
preliminary statement explaining these issues to the jury 
constitutes reversible error. 
 
In our view, the District Court correctly determined that 
instructions on these ancillary legal issues were 
unnecessary and could mislead the jury. As Amana points 
out, it had already been established in Cooper I that Amana 
was liable to Cooper for wrongful termination under the 
NJFPA. Thus, there was no longer any dispute that Cooper 
was a "franchise" within the meaning of the NJFPA and 
that the "license" and "community of interest" elements of 
the NJFPA had been satisfied. Similarly irrelevant are the 
issues of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
and the meaning of "constructive termination." The liability 
phase of the trial was over; the only issue in the second 
trial was the amount of damages owed to Cooper for 
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Amana's actual, not constructive, termination of the 
franchise. Revisiting these issues, especially with a 
"detailed annotation to New Jersey statutory and case law" 
-- Cooper's own description of its proposed jury charge -- 
would only have confused the jury. We believe the District 
Court's ruling was correct, and certainly was not plain 
error. 
 
Second, Cooper argues the District Court's instructions 
on pricing were erroneous and misleading to the jury. 
Cooper requested that the jury be instructed as follows: 
 
       Amana cannot as of March 8, 1994 materially alter the 
       historical relationship between the parties and must in 
       its pricing to Cooper recognize that Cooper functions as 
       a wholesale franchise, not as an appliance retailer.. . . 
       Amana's pricing of products to Cooper must take into 
       consideration Amana's historical relationship with 
       Cooper as a franchise as well as the traditional 
       wholesale discount to Cooper given by Amana when 
       compared to the prices Amana generally charged for 
       the same products to retailers who purchased 
       appliances directly. 
 
The District Court rejected this proposed charge and 
instead instructed the jury that Amana "could not price its 
appliances to Cooper, a wholesale distributor, or to retail 
dealers in Cooper's assigned territory, in such a way that 
Cooper would not have a reasonable opportunity to 
compete for Amana-brand sales in that territory." 
 
We do not believe the court misstated the law or misled 
the jury. The court's instruction adequately communicated 
the notion that in determining the fair market value of 
Cooper's franchise as of the termination date, the jury must 
assume that Amana's pricing to Cooper would not be 
affected by the ongoing litigation between the two. An 
explicit reference to historical pricing tactics was not 
necessary to make this point. In any event, it is clear the 
District Court's pricing instruction was not plain error so 
"fundamental and highly prejudicial" as to"result in a 
miscarriage of justice." Ryder, 128 F.3d at 136. 
 
C. Evidentiary Rulings 
 
Cooper also challenges a number of the District Court's 
evidentiary rulings. We review for abuse of discretion. See 
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SEC v. Hughes Capital Corp., 124 F.3d 449, 456 (3d Cir. 
1997). 
 
1. Evidence of Amana's Inconsistent Legal Positions 
 
In his opening statement, Amana's counsel told the jury 
that Amana did not have the right to make direct sales in 
Cooper's territory. After Cooper objected successfully to that 
statement,3 Amana's counsel modified it and said that at 
the time in question, Amana did not believe it had the right 
to make direct sales in Cooper's territory. Cooper now 
appeals the District Court's refusal to allow Cooper to 
introduce evidence purportedly showing that Amana did in 
fact believe that it had such a right: namely, a segment of 
Amana's post-trial brief from the first trial and a statement 
by Amana's counsel in oral argument on a motion. 
 
The record shows the District Court fully considered the 
request for admission but denied it on the ground that it 
would be more time-consuming than probative. Instead, the 
court allowed Cooper to admit a redacted version of the 
order holding that Amana had the right to make direct 
sales and invited Cooper to revisit the issue at a later time, 
which Cooper never did. We see no abuse of discretion in 
the District Court's exclusion of these materials. 
 
2. Alleged Failure to Give Effect to Pretrial Stipulations 
 
Cooper argues the testimony of former Amana executive 
Charles Mueller violated pretrial stipulations. On cross- 
examination, Mueller stated that Amana had intended to 
compete directly with Cooper in Cooper's sales territory and 
that Amana's president Robert Swam would "necessarily" 
have been involved in that decision. According to Cooper, 
these statements contradicted Amana's internal "five-year 
plans," produced during post-remand discovery and 
stipulated to represent Amana's company policy, as well as 
a pretrial statement made by Amana's counsel to the 
District Court to the effect that Swam should not be 
deposed because he had no knowledge of the issues to be 
tried. But Cooper did not object to Mueller's statements at 
trial: in fact, Cooper elicited them on cross-examination. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We held in Cooper I that Amana did have such a right. See 63 F.3d at 
279-80. 
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Cooper's argument accordingly seems to be that the District 
Court's failure to strike the statements, sua sponte, that 
Cooper itself brought out on cross-examination constitutes 
reversible plain error. We find this argument meritless. 
 
3. Other Evidentiary Challenges 
 
Cooper levels two additional challenges to the District 
Court's evidentiary rulings. First, Cooper claims the court 
wrongly denied its objection to hearsay testimony by 
Cooper's own principal, Bill Cooper, on cross-examination. 
As the record shows, however, Cooper objected to the 
question as being argumentative, not hearsay: 
 
       Q Do you know that [sic] he has said about this -- 
       this concept of somehow Cooper, after March 8, 
       1994 capturing all of the sales in your territory is 
       absurd? 
 
       A Well, that's not my -- 
 
          MR. LEHN: Objection, Your Honor, that's 
          argumentative. 
          [the objection is overruled] 
 
       Q You know he said that, don't you? 
 
       A Yes. I know he also said that no manufacturers 
       want to compete with their own distributors and no 
       one has dual distribution. 
 
       Q We'll get to that, also. 
 
The question was not argumentative, and the District Court 
properly overruled Cooper's objection on that basis. Even if 
Mr. Cooper's response was inadmissable hearsay, the 
District Court was not required to supply the proper basis 
for objection. Moreover, once the statement was admitted, 
the court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Amana's 
counsel to refer to it in his closing argument. 
 
Second, Cooper argues the District Court did not"permit 
Cooper to explore the implications of [Amana's valuation 
expert's] `model' by cross-examination." Although this 
statement implies that the District Court denied Cooper the 
right to cross-examine Amana's expert, the record reveals 
that Cooper engaged in a lengthy cross-examination. The 
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District Court merely sustained Amana's objection to 
Cooper's request that the expert calculate Cooper's 
potential 1994 sales on the witness stand by converting the 
actual sales by another distributor in another area of the 
country and then adjusting for differences in population 
density. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
cutting off this line of questioning on the basis that it was 
more prejudicial than probative. 
 
D. Prejudgment Interest 
 
Cooper also claims the District Court erred in denying 
prejudgment interest for the time period between the date 
of the wrongful termination and the jury's award of 
$377,000 in the second trial. (See Order of Oct. 8, 1998).4 
The District Court refused to grant prejudgment interest 
because of what it termed "preposterous" valuation theories 
advanced by Cooper in the second trial. See Cooper Distrib. 
Co. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., No. 91-5237, op. at 5 (Oct. 
8, 1998). Specifically, the court held: "Because . . . Cooper 
persisted in pressing estimates of damages which, in fact, 
bore no resemblance to reality and were `so unreasonable 
as to amount to bad faith,' settlement was precluded. It 
would not be equitable to award prejudgment interest and 
Cooper's application is denied." Id. at 7 (quoting In re 
Bankers Trust Co., 658 F.2d 103, 109 (3d Cir. 1981)). 
 
Both parties have submitted supplemental briefs 
discussing the propriety of the District Court's decision to 
deny prejudgment interest. Because of our disposition of 
the other claims, however, we believe it would be premature 
to decide the issue now. The determination of Cooper's lost 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In Cooper I, we affirmed the District Court's denial of prejudgment 
interest on its original NJFPA award of $13.475 million. We held that 
regardless whether the NJFPA claim was considered to arise in contract 
or tort, prejudgment interest was inappropriate because Cooper was not 
denied the use of its franchise while the preliminary injunction was in 
effect and accordingly, "Cooper's franchise existed until the date of 
judgment." 63 F.2d at 285. Consequently, no prejudgment interest was 
appropriate for the time period between November 1991 and March 8, 
1994. This appeal presents the separate issue of whether Cooper is 
entitled to prejudgment interest for the period from March 8, 1994 until 
October 22, 1997, the date of judgment in the second trial. 
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profits will require a new trial and, potentially, a new award 
of damages. It is impossible to predict either the date of 
judgment or the amount of damages to be awarded. 
Furthermore, to the extent the award of prejudgment 
interest is a matter of equitable discretion based upon the 
parties' conduct, we note the parties' conduct is not yet 
complete--the parties must return to the District Court and 
reinstitute proceedings on the issue of lost profits. 
Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court's denial of 
prejudgment interest, which may be raised, if at all, after 




We believe the District Court's decision was correct on all 
issues except its exclusion of evidence regarding Cooper's 
lost profits. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment in 
part, reverse in part, and remand for a determination of the 
amount of lost profits, if any, that Cooper sustained 
between November 1991 and March 8, 1994 as a result of 
Amana's unlawful termination of Cooper's franchise. 
Because our disposition of these issues requires further 
proceedings, we will also vacate the District Court's denial 
of prejudgment interest pending resolution of the 
proceedings. 
 
Each party to bear its own costs. 
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